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This thesis deals optimistically with the topic of feed-
ing the increasing world population. It first briefly
reviews the literature, favorable and unfavorable, from
early thoughts on the subject, past landmark books such
as Robert Malthus ' On Population and Dennis Meadows' The
Limits to Growth to The Global 2000 Report to the President .
In its analysis of the present situation, the paper
reviews historical data and current trends. In the area of
population, the imaginative, if radical, policies being
pursued in China are carefully examined. In agriculture,
several developments in the United States are brought out.
Finally, it analyzes the predominant position of the
United States in the area of agriculture, relative to both
the world in general, and the Soviet Union in particular.
Weaknesses are noted and discussed, but the conclusion is
drawn that beyond trade alone American agricultural super-
iority continues to offer important benefits and opportunities
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I . INTRODUCTION
The year is 2015. The world is embroiled in a desperate
struggle for survival. Millions of people have died; thou-
sands more die each day, their gaunt wasted bodies often
lie where they fall for days. In the United States and the
Soviet Union, domestic order is barely kept. Riots break
out sporadically to be quelled by civil authorities only
through increasing force. Europe and Japan are barely
recognizable as the economic giants of old. The Third World
is in anarchy. Armed bands control as much of the territory
as national governments.
It is not "the day after" nor "the week after." Nuclear
war is not the cause of this widespread suffering. For years,
the world had been living on the edge of disaster, agricul-
tural output had just barely been keeping up with rising
population. This year marked the third out of four in which
harvests in the United States and elsewhere were far below
normal. The first year it happened, nearly all stockpiles
of food were used to alleviate the problem. Then it happened
again, and there were no buffers, no reserves. Starvation
spread throughout the Third World; serious shortages occurred
in Japan and Europe, as the United States cut exports. The
third year, there was a modest recovery, but the United
States was the only country with surplus, which was used to
restock domestic reserves, or exported in small amounts to
Japan and Europe. The fourth year, this year, had been as
bad as the first.
Wheat is selling for five times what it was eight years
ago. Adults harken back to the "energy crisis" of the 1970'
s
when oil prices doubled and doubled again. Now oil prices
are half their 1990 peak, and grain is a speculation
commodity
.
The cause is not relevant; severe drought one year, a
new fungus the next. It does not matter. There is no one to
blame. Also irrelevant is the fact that even the worst of
the harvests described produced half again as much food as
the record crops at the height of the "Green Revolution."
The most important single contributing factor to the situation
described is population: the failure of national governments
to institute and enforce adequate programs of population con-
trol; the failure of developed countries to require such
programs as a prerequisite for technological, agricultural
and economic aid. Now, as a herd of deer that has overgrazed
its habitat, the world population is being thinned by natural
process- -starvation
.
This is a scenario not far from the minds of many experts
today: population growth out of control; agricultural output
unable to keep up; then disaster. The Global 2000 Report
Council on Environmental Quality and United States
Department of State: The Global 2000 Report to the President ,
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979).
paints a dark picture, nearly as grim as that depicted here.
2
Famine - 19751 is also particularly pessimistic. But perhaps
it is time to pause and ask as Scrooge did, "Are these the
shadows of things that will be, or are they shadows of things
that may be?" Beyond that, it is time to re-examine the
underlying philosophical assumptions held in approaching the
situation. Simply put, is the glass half empty, or half full?
The discussion that follows will examine population and
agriculture, two of the most pressing and insidious problems
facing the world. Pressing because their resolution must be
achieved over the next decade and a half, or the gloomy
shadows start to become stark outlines lacking only time to
fill in the grim colors of reality. Insidious because they can
build quietly while individual nations ignore them or act
irresolutely at best until they are nearly insurmountable.
Then, they will seem to burst on the scene as a crisis of un-
imagined proportions. Witness the chaos generated by energy
alone in the 1970 's, the anger and resentment and sometimes
violence aroused in the country by the "gas shortage." Then
think what the consequences would be of a similar or greater
crisis in agriculture. Think beyond gas lines and magazine
photos of hungry children. Think of standing in line for
food and regularly not being able to buy what you need, still
less what you want.
2William Paddock. Famine 19751 (Boston: Little, Brown,
1967) .
If the problem still is not close enough to home imagine
the potential conflict. "What if" U.S. harvest falls so
short we are unable to meet even minimum requirements agreed
to with the Soviet Union. Of course we cut off shipments in
order to feed ourselves and our allies, but suppose they
started seizing ships transporting grain elsewhere, to Europe
for example? "What if" it is not the Soviet Union, but a
Third World nation with a nuclear device. Thousands of
people are dying there of starvation. Why not threaten New
York in exchange for five million tons of wheat? It almost
seems reasonable.
There are three other aspects to be considered in further
examination of these problems. First is their interrelation-
ship. It is difficult to find in world affairs, two problems
that are more closely related than population and agriculture.
Population is clearly the independent variable. Were the world
to achieve zero population growth in the next five years, the
problem and its disastrous potential would disappear. Since
that will not happen, it is necessary to understand the close
relationship of each of these problems has with the others.
The second aspect is also the most encouraging. These
problems have solutions, feasible, socially acceptable solu-
tions. That is the major thrust of this paper. These are
not insurmountable hurdles. They are the shadows of things
that may be only. The glass is half full.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, these problems
present not only unique and difficult questions for the
United States, but also exceptionally promising opportuni-
ties. Today, this country produces, by itself, more than
3
330 million tons of grain annually. That constitutes pro-
portionally the same control over the world food market as
OPEC exercises over the world petroleum market. Together
with Australia and Canada, the United States forms a group
certainly more homogenous than OPEC which accounts for fully
4
75 percent of all grain exports in the world. Furthermore,
the relatively low population growth of this group ensures
that their sway over the world market will only increase as
food becomes more scarce. Whatever happens, the United States
will be able to feed its people.
The same cannot be said for the Soviet Union. In the
trade year which ended June 1983, the Soviet Union imported
5
46 million tons of grain, more than any country ever had.
Nearly half of that total came from the United States.
Imports accounted for one quarter of their total grain re-
quirement! If the grain embargo imposed by President Carter
3 . . .United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural
Statistics 1982 (Washington, 1982), p. 1.
4 United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1981 (New York:
United Nations, 1983), p. 15.
Kurt-EugenWadekin , "Soviet Agriculture's Dependence
on the West," Foreign Affairs 60 (Spring 1982): 6; Also
Lester R. Brown, U.S. & Soviet Agriculture: The Shifting
Balance of Power




in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was ineffec-
tive, it was due in part to the surplus existing at the time.
There was enough grain available from other sources to make
up the difference. In a few years time, that may not be the
case. If Soviet dependence on western grain is encouraged
and actually increases, they will be in less of a position to
reduce or threaten natural gas deliveries to Western Europe.
If we and other western nations bargain more acutely and
require realistic credit terms, we can offset the hard cur-
rency gains the Soviets may make from othersources
.
The advantage to be gained could be significant. In
the final chapters, this paper will discuss the possibilities
presented by the abundance this country takes for granted.
To those who protect the manipulation of food as policy,
there are two answers. First, the United States does not
exist to feed the world. If to a large extent this is the
case, as now, it is because the United States is in a position
to do so easily. Secondly, consider the alternatives.
11
I I . HISTORICAL TREATMENTS OF THE SUBJECT
To iterate once again, the object of this paper is not to
dismiss out of hand the potential for disaster implicit in
these problems. Nor is it to palliate the harsh reality of
the situation by claiming that "something will come up, some
miracle will occur, some technological breakthrough will be
achieved--it always has." But neither will it get caught up
in the emotional hue and cry and literacy wringing of hands
indulged in elsewhere. Instead, the problem will be looked
at from a rationally optimistic or optimistically rational
point of view. A mountain climber is constantly aware of the
three thousand foot sheer drop below him. Still he climbs.
The world faces a similar situation--with no real choice but
to go on
.
One of the best ways to look at any contemporary situation
is to start by looking at the problem as it has been perceived
in the past, for that certainly colors the way the future is
viewed. It is important to understand what assumptions were
made as a basis for past judgments in order to determine
whether these assumptions are valid and to what extent changing
them affects the outcome, prediction or conclusion.
Agriculture and population have a long historical past.
Nearly as long as there have been people, someone has felt that
the world was too crowded and that excessive population spelled
12
impending doom for civilization. Han Fei-Tzu, writing in the
fifth century B.C. said:
In ancient times, people were few but wealthy and
without strife. People at present think that five
sons are not too many, and each son has five sons
also .... Therefore people are more and wealth is
less; they work hard and receive little. The life of
a nation depends upon having enough food, not upon the
number of people.
Similar sentiments were expressed by Tertullian during the
Roman Empire:
The strongest witness is the vast population of the
earth to which we are a burden and she can scarcely
provide for our needs. . . . '
In 1751, Benjamin Franklin foresaw the possibility that
population of the United States would double every twenty
five years, but it was not a prospect he feared. Instead,
he saw that by doubling every twenty five years, in one
hundred years the United States would have more Englishmen
than England. This would only benefit the country, he
concluded
:
for... if you have room and subsistence enough... you
may make ten nations, equally populous and powerful;




Franklin saw population as national strength, as did many of
his contemporaries. He also perceived that the abundance of
the North American continent would easily support these people
Garrett Hardin, ed. , Population Evolution and Birth
Control : A Co llage of Controversial Ideas (San Francisco
W.H. Freeman and Company, 1969), p. 18.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., p. 20.
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This was the period of the perfectibility of man. The
intellectual giants of the age anticipated great strides
toward a Utopian society based on natural laws governing men
similar to these being described that governed nature. Robert
Wallace ascribed to these ideas. He anticipated that Utopia
would be achieved, but that population growth would even-
tually cause it to fail.
It would be impossible, therefore, to support the
great numbers of men that would be raised up under
a perfect government; the earth would be overstocked at
last, and the greatest admirers of such fanciful
schemes most foresee the fatal period when they would
come to an end, as they are altogether inconsistent „
with the limits of that earth in which they must exist.
The excessive population would then have to choose among
several extreme alternatives to reduce population. His
choices are far more harsh than anyone would dare propose
today. Theyincluded selective castration at birth, infanti-
cide, and legal age limits beyond which a person would not
be allowed to live! Wallace recognized that men would never
accept such practices freely:
Force and arms must at last decide their quarrels and
the deaths of such as fall in battle, leave sufficient
provisions for the survivors, and make room for others
to be born.
Thus the tranquility and numerous blessings of the
Utopian governments would come to an end; war, and
cruel and unnatural customs, be introduced, and a stop
put to the increase of mankind, to the advancement





spite of the most excellent laws and wisest
• inprecautions. ±u
Not all agreed with Wallace. William Godwin for one,
was directly at odds with those conclusions. In Of Population:
An Enquiry Concerning the Power of Increase in the Numbers
of Mankind , Godwin concedes that population would continue
to grow but would never exceed the limits of subsistence
imposed by a finite earth, a situation which in any event
was far in the future. Before that, he concluded, man would
so perfect himself that he would become essentially immortal,
and that Utopian society would eventually produce individuals
of such virtuous mind that they would cease to propagate.
It was into this heady intellectual atmosphere that Thomas
Robert Malthus injected a dose of sobriety. Writing in
response to Godwin and a Frenchman, Jean de Condorcet, Malthus
12published An Essay on the Principle of Population . The
essay drew immediate attention and caused equally immediate
controversy, so much so that Malthus spent most of his re-
maining thirty six years defending and documenting his
conclusions. By 1830, he had produced a second edition, a
Ibid.
, p . 23
.
William Godwin, Of Population: An Enquiry Concerning
the Power of Increase in the Numbers of Mankind (London:
Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme , and Brown, 1820; Reprints of
Economic Classics ed., New York: Augustus M. Kelly, 1964).
12 Thomas Robert Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of
Population as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society
(London, 1798; published as On Population in the Modern
Library, New York: Random House, 1960).
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book more than twice the length of the original treatise.
He had added numerous case studies and further evidence that
his conclusions were justified.
Today his ideas are as controversial as ever. Experts
fall on both sides of the argument. To be Malthusian is
for some to be a sayer of doom, to reject the innate genius
of man and accept the inevitability of his demise. For
others, Malthus represents a realistic point of view, a
warning sign on the road of human development that has been
ignored for too long.
Since the book is such a landmark in this field, it
deserves closer examination. His ideas seem strong enough
at the start. First, and as a basis for all further argu-
ments, Malthus states that, "Population, when unchecked,
increases in geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only
in arithmetical ratio. A slight acquaintance with the power
of numbers will shew [sic] the immensity of the first power
13in comparison with the second." Under this assumption
even if the earth can produce an infinite amount of food,
that production would be so quickly outpaced by population
doubling every twenty five years, that in just two centuries
there would be 256 times as many people, but only 9 times as
much food. There is no limit to either factor, only the
assumption that one increases geometrically and the other
arithmetically.
13 Ibid., p. 9
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Consequently, population must constantly be held in check
by some means, but that, "...it is difficult to conceive of
any check to population which does not come under the descrip-
14
tion of some species of misery or vice." As checks to
population he included the poor sanitary conditions of towns,
war, malnutrition among the poor and discouragements to marriage
(by which he meant primarily minimum age limits) . Malthus
was also opposed to any method of birth control within the
sanctity of marriage, on the grounds that it too promoted
"misery and vice."
Additionally, regardless of societal checks, population
would always increase to the limits of subsistence. If food
were abundant, population growth would be rapid; if food were
scarce, growth would be slower. There would be times after
plagues, wars or after new land is brought under cultivation
when most people would have enough to eat and more, but
eventually there would be at least as many people as could
barely survive.
Since all attempts to limit population result in misery
and vice, and since population always expands to the limit
of subsistence, man would always be thrown between abundance
and bare existence. This theorem was in response to the
perfectability of man.
Furthermore, according to Malthus, this problem lay not
in the distant future, but was close at hand:
14 Ibid., p. 10
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I have read some of the speculations on the perfecti-
bility of man and of society with great pleasure. I
have been warmed and delighted with the enchanting
picture which they hold forth. I ardently wish for
such happy improvements. But I see great, and to my
understanding, unconquerable difficulties in the way
of them. 15
Inevitably, regardless of the productive capacity of the
earth or the rationality of man, the final limits of the
world would be reached well before any natural limits to
population were reached, but well after population has ex-
panded beyond the comfortable capacity of the earth.
Malthus drew these conclusions in the early Eighteenth
Century, when infant mortality ranged as high as seventy
percent, when pestilence and disease beyond the control of
man limited population growth to less than one percent annually
and when the average life expectancy worldwide was about
thirty five years. He could not begin to consider the
ramifications of later developments in health care and medi-
cine that cut infant mortality to less than ten percent and
extended life expectancy to fifty six years.
The conclusions are valid if the assumptions are accept-
able. So far, however, despite the medical developments and
health and sanitary improvements of the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries, which helped the population growth rate
increase to 2.9 percent, Malthus has ended up on the wrong




expanded geometrically, doubling about every thirty five
years; but through one means or another, agriculture has
kept pace. The two most important contributing factors to
this result were the failure on Malthus ' part, or for that
matter, almost everyone's part, to recognize the enormous
agricultural potential of North America, and the inability
to foresee the extraordinary revolution that has taken place
in overall agricultural output, particularly in the last
thirty to forty years.
To this point in time, Malthus' basic premise has not
been borne out, and though he did not indicate a time limit
for his calculations, he implied relatively short term.
Since the earth would seem to have an endpoint of production,
his conclusions may yet be realized. But their inaccuracy
thus far implies a fallacy in simple additive/multiplicative
solutions
.
More recent Malthusian projections suffer from similar
shortcomings, despite the fact that they have expanded beyond
the seemingly intuitive assumptions of Malthus. Computer
projections and correlation coefficients have replaced simple
arithmetic in forecasting doom.
1 fi
One such projection is The Limits to Growth , a very
important work in the field. It has been to recent analysis
what Malthus' book was to historical debate. It has stirred
1 ft
Dennis Meadows et al., The Limits to Growth (New York
Universe Books, 1972).
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discussion and fired controversy. It too has become a label
applied to an entire group of experts, usually by other ex-
perts who disagree with the conclusions, the assumptions,
the methodology/ or all three- Complete understanding of the
topic requires reasonably careful consideration of The Limits
to Growth and its critics.
The book was published at the behest of Aurelio Peccei,
founder and president of the Club of Rome. It is the result
of work done at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology by
Dennis and Donnella Meadows and others. At its base is a
concept called systems dynamics, a modelling technique first
17proposed by Jay Forester in World Dynamics .
The basic precept of systems dynamics is to be able to
combine a variety of factors each of which is constantly sub-
ject to change and all of which are closely related. A change
in one factor produces a change in one or more of the other
factors. The model should be designed to accept the change,
produce the appropriate secondary changes and take into account
such other factors as time delays, positive and negative
feedback loops and other limitations inherent in the real
world
.
The Limits to Growth assesses the world situation in terms
of five basic factors: population, food production, indus-
trailization, pollution, and consumption of non-renewable




resources, such as oil and minerals. All five factors are
closely related; they clearly affect one another significantly.
They also are logically fundamental to economic growth and
development
.
These five factors expand along exponential growth curves
in much the same manner that Malthus predicted geometric
growth for population against arithmetic growth for agriculture
Exponential growth occurs when a factor increases by a fixed
or growing percentage rather than by a fixed value. The re-
sult, of course, is far faster growth. For example, a person
with one hundred dollars adding to it at the rate of five
dollars per year would double his holding in twenty years.
Another person with one hundred dollars adding to it at the
rate of 5 percent per year would double his holdings in just
fourteen years.
These are simple rules of mathematics, and there is no
controversy so far. But, as seen in the discussion of Malthus,
the underlying assumptions upon which any model is constructed
are at least as important as the model itself. The assump-
tions are even more important when the model is an ostensibly
objective forecast produced by a computer. It is important,
though sometimes difficult to remember even today in the
midst of the computer explosion, that a computer is a tool,
no more and no less. It adds, subtracts, multiplies and
divides, correlates, provides regression analysis, and so on
at a very rapid rate. It is, however, entirely dependent
21
on the operator for data and direction. This dependence is
often forgotten or ignored. A computer is objective in its
output only in so far as the input is objective. No computer
exists that will discard or reject information because it
is not objective. Judgments of that nature are not part
of a computer's ability.
Furthermore, a computer cannot add objectivity. It can
only add the aura of objectivity. It is easier, and more
dangerous, to view as objective a statement that "the com-
puter projection indicates..." than it is to give the same
credence to "After manipulating the data, our conclusions
are...". In fact, the statements mean essentially the same
thing
.
The problem has been summarized as "garbage in, garbage
out." This does not mean that the models discussed in The
Limits to Growth are garbage, but because of the importance
of the underlying assumptions, "Malthus in, Mai thus out."
If the assumptions upon which the model is predicated are
Malthusian in nature, it is much more likely that the conclu-
sions will be Malthusian.
Since the crux of the matter lies in the general attitudes
and assumptions which form the foundation for a particular
study, it is important to review the model and its projections
in this light. This has been done at some length in the case
of The Limits to Growth by an equally learned and distinguished
group at the University of Sussex, led by Christopher Freeman.
22
1 8
Their results are published in Models of Doom . It is beyond
the scope of this paper to conduct as detailed an examination
and critique as they have, but it is interesting to review
briefly their analysis and conclusions along with those
of the MIT group as expressed in The Limits to Growth .
The three most important assumptions inherent in The
Limits to Growth are: (1) resources of the world, including
non-renewable minerals, agricultural input factors, capacity
to absorb pollution, etc., are finite; (2) consumption of
these resources is growing exponentially; and (3) human values
and technology change too slowly to alter the conclusion
apparent from (1) and (2) that there are limits to growth.
The MIT group tested various combinations that included
granting mineral reserves extending to 250 years at then cur-
rent consumption rates, allowing nuclear energy to completely
replace petroleum as the primary source of energy and assuming
that energy would therefore be inexhaustible, reducing virgin
resource requirements by seventy-five percent through recycling
and conservation. In other words, they essentially allowed
resources to be unlimited. Even under such optimistic con-
ditions, industrialization creates such severe pollution that
the world system collapses long before 2100.
Other combinations included the cumulative advantages
arising from those allowed previously, plus doubled food
1 8Christopher Freeman et al., Models of Doom (New York
Universe Books, 1973).
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production, "Perfect" birth control (no unwanted children)
and reduced rate of pollution to one quarter of 1970 levels.
With these seemingly generous advantages, collapse is post-
poned by twenty to thirty years, but still occurs before
the end of the next century.
By contrast, Models of Doom produces equally startling
but radically different results. Freeman, et al., criticize
the MIT group primarily on two grounds. First, that the
assumptions for base level of resources are too low; and
second, the rate of change of technology must be allowed to
grow exponentially along with other factors.
Included in the first criticism are a wide variety of
methodological problems noted by the Sussex group. These
problems range from insufficient data to justify long range
projections to the use of world averages instead of at least
separating the world into developed and underdeveloped coun-
tries. The MIT group seems to have foreseen these criticisms,
because they apologize for the lack of data, noting that
such information has only recently been systematically collected
and then only in more developed countries. They also admit
that their model, like any other model, is inherently inade-
quate and imperfect.
However, this did not prevent them from making broad,
forceful conclusions such as, "The limits to growth on this
19planet will be reached in the next one hundred years,"
19Meadows, p. 186
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conclusions made more forceful by the prestige of the members
of the group and of the institution they represented.
The second criticism made of The Limits to Growth is
more fundamental, as it gets closer to the effect bias and
attitudes have on predictive models. Freeman shows that by
allowing just a one percent annual growth rate in that tech-
nology which applies to each of the five factors, the collapse
predicted by the MIT group is postponed almost indefinitely.
In fact, Meadows himself concludes in the second revision of
the Technical Reports portion of the study, "...It is possible
to pick a set of parameters which allow material, capital and
20population growth to continue through the year 2100..."
In a vein similar to The Limits to Growth , The Global 200
21
Report to the President was published in 1979. In fact many
of the principals in the MIT-Club of Rome group participated
in The Global 2000 Report . The conclusions are, if it is
possible, more stark and frightening than those presented in
The Limits to Growth . "If present trends continue the world
in 2000 will be more crowded, more polluted, less stable
ecologically, and more vulnerable to disruption than the world
22
we live in now." By itself that hardly constitutes a great
20 Dennis Meadows, et al., Technical Report (New York
Universe Books, 1972) , as quoted in Freeman, p. 133.
21Council on Environmental Quality and United States
Department of State, Global 2000 .
22 Ibid
. , p. 1
.
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revelation, but the report is much more specific in several
areas, predicting catastrophe almost beyond imagination by
as early as 2030
.
It is not necessary to discuss in detail the conclusions
presented by Global 2000 , but it is important to note that as
in the case of Malthus and Limits to Growth , Global 2000 has
important and expert critics who find fault with its assump-
tions, methodology, and conclusions. Foremost among them are
Professor Julian Simon and the late Herman Kahn
.
Characterized as cornucopians by their critics, Simon
23
and Kahn have written extensively regarding the future.
Their prognostications which have at least as valid histori-
cal backing as those opposing, are positive and optimistic.
It seems clear that, as in most areas, there are at
least two sides to the question of world development. The
question itself is broad enough to encompass many viewpoints.
Therefore, the discussion hereafter will be limited to the
population/agriculture interrelationship, venturing afield
only as required to address questions relevant to that
topic. It will be necessary to review recent data and examine
current trends and future possibilities more specifically
than has been done heretofore, and the question will be con-
sidered largely in isolation in order to assess potential
areas of United States' advantage. Finally, conclusions will
23Julian Simon, Global 2000 Revised (Washington: The
Heritage Foundation, 1984)~ See also Herman Kahn, The
Coming Boom (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982).
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be drawn and alternative courses of action will be identified
that might promote U.S. interests in other areas.
27
III. POPULATION
Regardless of whether the world is viewed from the Mal-
thusian, neo-Malthusian , or Cornucopian standpoint, there is
little question that one of the most pressing problems in the
world today is the ever increasing number of people alive on
the planet. As a Malthusian, one assumes that the voracious
appetite of the ever-growing mass will eventually consume all
the world has to offer and be reduced to destruction and
despair. A cornucopian assumes that the world has much more
to offer, but that the current high rate of population growth
is an anomaly anyway. Both recognize the need to reduce
population increase.
Unlike nuclear war, which is controlled by a few educated
individuals who understand the possible consequences of such
a course of action, the population explosion is controlled
by literally billions of people, who fail to recognize that
the aggregate of their individual decisions to reproduce may
have deleterious consequences nearly as serious in the long
run as those associated with nuclear war.
Population growth is a present danger. Its consequences
are already clearly visible, and increasing in severity each
year. The phenomenal rate of growth of the world population
in this century, particularly after World War II, is just
that, a phenomenon unprecedented in history. From the time
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of Christ until 1900, demographers estimate that the world
population grew at an annual rate of somewhat less than one
24half of one percent. Since 1900 world population has nearly
tripled including growing of 2.1 percent annually for the
last forty years.
There are many faces to the population problem. There
are the faces of the children in the Sahelian whose dull,
listless eyes stare out from gaunt, drawn, severely malnour-
ished bodies. There is the face of the new father in China
where male heirs are more important than perhaps anywhere in
the world, whose wife just delivered their only child, a
baby girl. There is the face of the mother in India who has
watched her second child in the span of one year die from an
infection contracted because of poor sanitary conditions.
There is the face of the husband in Latin America whose young
wife has just died from complications associated with the
birth of their fifth child in six years.
There are also many facets of the population problem. It
seems to be made up of several vicious, self-perpetuating
cycles any one of which, if broken, would appear to lead to
resolution of the problem. One such cycle is that associated
with old-age security. A couple in India must have six child-






one son will survive to care for them in their last years.
If they could be certain of being cared for whether by ensur-
ing the survival of a son from among fewer children through
better health care, or by increased government programs for
the aging derived from economic development, they would likely
have fewer children. But national economic gains are eaten
away by 16.6 million new children born in India each year,
so neither adequate health care nor old age protection are
available
.
Another cycle is education. In Peru, women with no educa-
tion have an average of two more children than women with
just six years of education. In Latin America as a whole,
women with secondary education have three fewer children than
26
. „ ^ ^ nother women. Education reduces fertility by delaying
marriage, improving economic well-being, and providing alterna-
tives to being the mother of five and dying young. It also
provides knowledge of available birth control measures. But
neither the families nor the government can afford to educate
all the children, and females are usually the ones who lose
out
.
Still another cycle is that of birth control information
and availability. It can be separated from general education
if resources are provided to educate and make available any
form of contraception. A survey in Jamaica in 1981 revealed
United Nations "The States of World Population," UN
Monthly Chronicle 77 (July 1982): 82.
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that 60 percent of the women interviewed would rather not
have had their last child. But resources required for such
intensive national programs are not available. The United
Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) has estimated
that the fertility rate worldwide would drop by one if women
27
could easily choose not to have any more children.
Although there are many faces and many facets to world
population problems, there is only one solution--have fewer
children. For many years, the accepted way to accomplish
that was through economic development. The overriding theme
heard from the Third World at the World Population Conference
in Bucharest in 1974 was essentially, "Give us aid and a
chance to develop, and the population problem will solve
itself.
"
It has long been evident that economic development and
population growth were closely related. Development leads
first to faster growth, through better health care and better
living standards; it then leads into a phase known as demo-
graphic transition where fertility drops and population growth
slows. Demographic transition is attributable to breaking
the cycles of education, old age security, and so forth. It
is also attributable to the fact that in a modern industrial
society, children are an economic burden for far longer than




One country that made the transition with remarkable
speed and ease in recent years is Japan. During the 1930 's,
Japan reported birth rates of about thirty per thousand indi-
2 8
eating a population growth rate of 1.7 percent. This
birth rate remained fairly constant during the war. In the
immediate post-war years the birth rate fell off artificially
because the national income was only 50-60 percent of pre-war
levels, and couples chose not to have children in a period
when they could not afford them. A large portion of the
decline is associated with illegal abortions, which became
so widespread that abortion laws were soon liberalized.
At this point, Japan began undergoing the demographic
transition. As the country recovered and the economy grew,
the birth rate increased to about thirty four per thousand
in 1947-1949, after which it began to fall quite dramatically,
29
to seventeen per thousand by 1959. By 1961, even with
significant improvements in the death rate, the population
of Japan was growing at only 0.9 percent annually, a rate
which has remained fairly constant since then.
Unfortunately, many developing countries made it only
half-way through the important demographic transition. They
made it only to the point of higher fertility and lower mortality
2 8Jacki Minoui, "The Baby Boom and After," Japan Quarterly
[ July-September 1961) .
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rates brought about by modest improvements in health care
and sanitation. The result, of course, is unusually rapid
population growth which seems to preclude further economic
development sufficient to complete the transition.
It is probably fair to say that the primary contributing
factor to the current situation in world population growth
is the improvement that has occurred in the death rate in the
Third World as a result of efforts on the part of the World
Health Organization and similar international agencies. This
is not a statement apportioning blame. It is simply a matter
of fact that widespread innoculations and dissemination of
basic rules of sanitation have radically reduced incidents of
decimating infections and epidemics. The death toll from
formerly contagious and fatal diseases has been cut so
severely that the average life expectancy of a child born in
Chad today is ten full years longer than it was thirty years
ago. Longer life expectancy is indicative of the fact that
fewer people have died each year. It is clear that if the
additive factor, births, remains constant, while the subtrac-
tive factor, deaths, is reduced, the total can only increase,
which is precisely what has happened in the world in recent
decades
.
Take for example the relationship between health care and
birth rate. Health care improvements lower mortality in all
age groups but these improvements are not immediately
Ibid
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apparent. Consequently, couples in Lesser Developed Countries
continue to produce enough children to offset the infant
mortality rate with which they are familiar. If they want
four children, they have six to ensure the survival of four.
If improved health care reduces infant mortality by 25 percent,
the rate of population growth increases by 12 percent in this
simple example. This increase results from reduced infant
mortality alone. In fact, worldwide infant mortality has been
halved in the last thirty years.
However, despite serious problems which still exist in
parts of the Third World, the situation is not as bad as ex-
perts once predicted. There are signs of hope. The acceler-
ating growth rate reached a peak of 1.99 percent in the
1960-1965 time frame, and has been declining ever since.
During the last five years the growth rate has fallen to 1.70
32 ...percent. This may not seem significant but its importance
becomes clear when the huge number representing the world's
current population enters the equation. There are about 4.5
billion people in the world today. A reduction of 1/10 of
1 percent in the rate of growth means 4.5 million fewer people
each year. Over time the numbers add up amazingly fast. The
UNFPA now estimates that there will be about 6.1 billion
people by the year 2000. That is 20 percent fewer than the
7.5 billion there would have been if the population had continued
32 Ibid
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to grow at the same rate as during the 1950 ' s. Furthermore,
they expect the growth rate to continue to decline reaching
about 1.5 percent by the turn of the century. Current esti-
mates call for the world population to continue to grow
33
until about 2025 then actually begin to decline.
Much of the slower growth rate witnessed recently is the
result of falling birth rates among developed countries. In
1950, North and South America had approximately the same
population. The slower growth rate and falling birth rate
experienced in North America since then means that South
and Central America now add four times as many people each
year. Mexico alone adds more people than Canada and the
United States combined.
In Europe, the rate of growth has slowed even more
dramatically than in North America. The rate of increase in
Western Europe in 1970 was 0.56 percent; in 1975, it was
only 0.32 percent. In Eastern Europe, birth rates dropped
so low that the governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia
adopted pro-natalist policies. In Easy Germany, the popula-
tion actually declined from 1975 to 1981. Austria, Belgium,
Luxembourg and the United Kingdom have all achieved population
,
• , • • 34stabilization.
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UN, "World Population," Bl.
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UN Yearbook 1980 : See also Lester R. Brown, World
Population Trends: Signs of Hope, Signs of Stress
,
WorldWatch Paper 8 (Washington: Worldwatch Institute, 1976),
pp. 9-13.
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This is not to say that there have not been achievements
elsewhere. The rate of growth in Cuba has been cut by 47
percent since 1970. Chile, Columbia, Thailand, South Korea
and Indonesia have all achieved rate reductions of 15-25
percent. Even India, which still has a rate over 2 percent,
35has cut that rate by 15 percent in the last ten years.
The most spectacularly successful case of effective,
radical family planning has occurred in recent years in the
People's Republic of China. China is by far the most popu-
lous nation on Earth. During the last decade, the Chinese
population grew by 157 million people, a number equal to the
combined present population of West Germany, England and
France; this despite the First Campaign and the Second Cam-
paign to limit population.
The efforts initiated in the First and Second Campaigns
abated during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revo-
lution, but as the political situation following Mao's death
stabilized, China's leaders recognized that rapid population
growth posed the single biggest threat to the continued
development of China.
It became readily apparent that past efforts were inade-
quate, lacking organization and follow through. Even more
recent programs to promote the four person family had failed
to stem the tide. China was rapidly approaching a point
Ibid.
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where failure spelled chaos and collapse, because of the long
term implications of continued growth. In 1979, the Chinese
leadership faced the problem squarely and took resolute,
radical action. In light of their apparent success in this
difficult area, it is instructive to review the initiatives
taken and assess their possible application to other areas
of the world.
The Chinese program for population control is a combination
of incentives, disincentives, education, availability, persua-
sion, and according to soem, coercion. The most basic goal
of population control in China is the achievement of not just
stabilization, but actual reduction. The proposed norm in
China is the one child family. Chinese couples are encouraged,
37persuaded, and "mobilized" to limit their offspring to a
single child.
Since the current program in China is built on the founda-
tion of the one child family, couples who pledge themselves
3 8
to only one child receive an "Only Child Glory Certificate."
Katherine Chiu Lyle, "Planned Birth in Tianjin," China
Quarterly 83 (September 1980): 551-563. See also Ashwari Saith,
"Economic Incentives for a One Child Family in Rural China,"
China Quarterly 87 (September 1981) : 492-503; and Judith
Jacobsen, Promoting Population Stabilization: Incentive s for
Small Families
, Worldwatch Paper 54 (Washington: WorldWatch
Institute, 1983)
, pp. 26-30.
37Jacobsen, p. 44 quotes a Chinese birth planning worker
as follows: "mobilization is different from persuasion .... [We]
mobilize the people to do this or that where we fail to per-
suade them. .. .We hope they understand later."
3 8
Pi-Chao Chen, "Eleven Million Chinese Opt for 'One Child
Glory Certificate'," People (a monthly periodical from the
International Planned Parenthood Federation), 9:4.
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Recognizing that such accolades are valuable but intangible,
the Chinese program goes much farther. Upon the birth of the
child, the mother immediately receives two extra weeks of
paid maternity leave. The parents begin receiving a stipend
from the state amounting to one month's combined wages. This
stipend continues until the child is fourteen years of age.
The parents also receive preferential consideration in apply-
ing for jobs with the state outside of the commune, which pay
better. The family is given higher priority for larger housing
and in some areas, may receive as much as twice the land to
build on as a family with more than one child. The parents
are rewarded throughout their lives even to the point of
receiving a 5 percent bonus in their pensions. (Childless
39
couples receive a 10 percent bonus. )
The child also gains lifelong advantages in addition to
those received through his parents. His status as an only
child entitles him completely subsidized health care. He
also is allowed a full adult food ration from his very first
day. An only child is given priority in education and employ-
ment in much the same manner as his parents.
The idea, of course, is to make the prospect of a one
child family more attractive. The idea is also promoted by
making larger families less attractive. The birth of a second
child not only revokes and suspends all privileges previously
39 Lyle, p. 557. Also Jacobsen, p. 2;
tendered, but also makes the parents liable to pay back all
stipends and awards received up to that time. In addition,
if a parent received a better job based on the one child
family status, that position is immediately forfeited. In
certain portions of the country a fine is imposed over and
above loss and repayment of stipends. Revenues from these
fines are applied toward the only child benefits given to
,. . U1 40those who remain eligible.
The only child program is encouraged in other ways as
well. The government has actively entered the family planning
process and birth planning has taken on aspects of other parts
of a centrally controlled state. In other areas, quotas are
assigned to increase production; in family planning, quotas
are assigned in order to reduce it. The State Council Staff
Office for Planned Birth, re-established in 1973, assigns
quotas to provinces which assigns them to districts, which
assigns them to divisions and so on, down to the local sub-
division level
.
Government family planning workers are an important part
of this process. They visit communes, work brigades and
factories together with "barefoot doctors" (paramedics),
mid-wives and party officials. Birth planning groups are
formed so that when quotas are received they are allocated
among eligible couples. A couple's eligibility is determined
40 Ibid., p. 560. See also Saith, p. 500
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by the group. Newlyweds who have conformed to the delayed
marriage guidelines are first, married couples who are child-
less are second, and couples who have adopted a child or who
are handicapped and have only one child are third. (Disabled
and handicapped persons are the only ones allowed to have more
than one child and they may only have two if they receive an
additional quota.)
The family planning workers also act as educators. They
provide information regarding contraceptives, abortion, and
sterilization. They are also tasked with actively persuading
couples to conform to the one child standard.
Couples who are ineligible to have an authorized child
or whose name did not make it onto the quota list must take
appropriate precautions. Here too, the Chinese government is
actively involved. For the childless or one child couple, all
contraceptives are free. The government makes available the
whole range of mechanical and chemical contraceptives, includ-
ing the "visiting pill" for couples whose jobs keep them
separated most of the time. All operations and procedures
related to contraception are also free. This includes inser-
tion and removal of the IUD, sterilization and abortion.
Though preferences vary from region to region and whether
the couple resides in the city, the suburbs, or the country,
IUD's are the most popular method nationwide. Oral contracep-
tives are second, and sterilization is third. Sterilization
in China most often means tubal ligation, despite its increased
40
complexity and greater risk compared to a vasectomy. In
Tianjin in 1978, for example, 3593 tubal ligations were
performed as opposed to only 175 vasectomies. There is a
widespread belief in China that vasectomies reduce male
strength. There is a one time benefit of about a half-month's




Although abortion is not considered a form of birth
control in China, the law is very liberal and it is widely
practiced. Abortions are free in China, except to unmarried
women. For an abortion in the first four months, a woman is
granted 15 days work points. After the first four months,
21 days are granted, but due to the ready availability of
the operation and the pressure applied to a woman carrying
an unauthorized child, abortions after the first four months
are rarely required.
The combination of these benefits enables a couple to
supplement their income by as much as one third by electing
to have only one child. When compared with the payback
requirements imposed for having more than one child, the
difference is even greater.
The results of this campaign have been extraordinary.
The population growth rate in China has plummeted to less than
1.2 percent overall, with some provinces reporting rates as
41 Lyle, p. 5 51
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low as 0.7 percent. But the program is not without its
negative aspects. One such aspect is required sterilization.
As of 1980, one parent of a family with two children must
42
undergo sterilization. It is difficult to determine to
what extent this requirement is being enforced, but similar
policy imposed in India during the national emergency declared
as a result of food shortages from 1975-1978 caused significant
political backlash and contributed to electoral defeat of
Indira Ghandi's government at the time, even though the
policy in India was never carried out.
Another, more disconcerting aspect of China's one child
policy is the continuous flow of reports of infanticide.
Sons have always been very highly regarded in China. In the
context of the current policy, male offspring are even more
important, with the result that female children have been
43
reported being neglected, abandoned or worse.
A final consideration of China's radical reduction is the
long-term implication. If present trends continue, the popu-
lation of China will stabilize about 2010 at around 1.2
billion. Thereafter, it will decline. In the meantime,
the population will undergo a significant aging process of
far greater proportions than that which is causing such
42Jacobsen, p. 27.
43Lijianquo and Zhang Jioaying, "Infanticide in China,"
New York Times
, 11 April 1983, Sec. I, p. 25. See also Zing
Lin, "Protecting Infant Girls," Beijing Review, 31 January,
1983, p. 4.
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difficulty for the United States, Europe and Japan. The
problem experienced in the United States in maintaining the
viability of Social Security will pale in comparison to the
problem China will face.
That, however, is a problem of a different nature which
would seem to have far less serious ramifications and more
easily attainable solutions than the alternative of allowing
uncontrolled population growth. The Chinese have long been
the example of a country where population growth was unstoppa-
ble. They are disproving that. They are now an example of
what resolute, coordinated efforts can accomplish, and as
such should be studied by other countries trying to solve a
similar problem. The Chinese solution is severe, to say the
least, but so is the Chinese problem. Other countries, in
reviewing the steps taken in China, can pick those aspects
which are less severe, such as incentive and education pro-
grams, and tailor them to their own needs.
Fortunately, this is what is happening in several countries
in the Third World. Taiwan, South Korea and Pakistan are
among those countries who have initiated incentive/disincen-
tive programs, which are beginning to have an effect.
Still, the world's population will continue to grow for
some time. If it stabilizes at 10.1 billion, as projected by
the United Nations, there will still be more than twice as
many people then as there are now. How and what those people




In light of the enormous growth in population of recent
decades, it seems incredible that millions, if not hundreds
of millions, do not die each year of starvation, especially
during periods of drought and other diasters. It is certainly
true that hundreds of millions are hungry and malnourished.
Malthus observed that population expands to the limits of
subsistence, but with 219,000 people added each day for the
last ten years, it seems that the limit of subsistence should
have long since been passed. Instead, one reason these people
have found at least a bare minimum of food available to them
is that the limit of subsistence has been constantly pushed
farther and farther back. Just as there are more people
alive today than ever before, there is more food available.
If it is true that half of all the people who have ever
lived are alive today, then it must also be true that half
of all the food ever eaten is being consumed today as well.
To the various reasons for population growth already
observed must be added another: the internationalization of
food. It is closely related to the other reasons because it
is based on technology and because it resulted from the global
outlook engendered by the expanding web of social and economic
ties between and among nations and regions. While it is
still true that 89 percent of all food raised is consumed at
44
or near the point of production, that figure is down from
98 percent just after World War II. The portion of food
production that enters international trade is what has made
population growth possible by alleviating shortages and famine
that would otherwise mean starvation to millions.
Formerly, crop failures or drought were a largely local-
ized problem. They certainly had little effect beyond a
particular region, such as the disastrous wheat harvest in
France in 1872 which drove up prices throughout Europe.
Elsewhere in the world, in the absence of CARE, UNICEF and
the like, crop failure led directly to starvation for millions
as in India in the late Eighteenth Century or China in 1877
44
when ten million are reported to have died.
Today, local agricultural shortfalls can be alleviated
by massive imports of commercial grain or food aid. This
is true only because the food is available elsewhere. To a
very large extent, elsewhere means the United States, which
accounted for the largest proportion of the world's exported
45food supply in everything from eggs to eggplant.
In more important basic foodstuffs, the U.S. lead is even
more impressive. The United States accounts for more than a
44
U SDA , Will There be Enough Food : 1981 Yearbook of
Agriculture (Washington: USDA, 1981), p. 28.
45USDA Agricultural Statistics 1982. The United States
accounted for almost 20 percent of all eggs produced,
including 257 million dozen exported. The U.S. also produced
21 percent of all the eggplant grown.
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third of all wheat exports, half of all corn, and nearly two
thirds of all soybean exports. The world as a whole is so
reliant on the United States, that when the U.S. harvest is
just 10 percent below expectations, food prices in some parts
46
of the world rise as much as 200 percent.
The point right now is not the domination exerted by the
United States; rather, the point is how this situation came
about, and what it portends for the future. The world's
population has been supported by an enormous growth in agri-
47
cultural production worldwide, the so-called "Green Revolution."
Most of the innovations of the Green Revolution trace their
roots to advances developed in the United States. In agri-
culture as in no other field, the world follows where the
United States leads.
For many years, agricultural production in the United
States expanded as land area settled expanded, from the east
coast inland. Little attention was paid to increasing produc-
tivity. The growing population of the country was fed by
46 USDA, 1981 Yearbook
,
p. 62. See also Lyle P. Schertz,
"World Food Prices and the Poor," Foreign Affairs (April
1974) : 513.
47The "Green Revolution" began in the early sixties with
the development and wide distribution of higher yielding
varieties of grain, especially wheat and rice. It produced
spectacular gains initially. For example, India doubled
wheat production in six years. Some countries such as
Mexico briefly exported wheat. But the relentless growth
of population eventually caused the situation to revert to
one of shortage and insecurity.
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bringing more land under tillage. Export products were
primarily cotton and tobacco and other plants grown easily
here, but not in Europe and which could be or did not need
to be cured for the voyage. Foodstuffs constituted a relatively
small portion because Europe grew what it needed. A shortage
in one country was made up more easily by overland shipments
from another country than shipment by sea.
Wheat began to be exported in noteworthy amounts only in
the middle of the nineteenth century. By 1865, agricultural
exports provided 82 percent of all American exports. Only
after 1910 did industry provide more than half of the coun-
try's foreign trade.
It was the Industrial Revolution which provided the
impetus for improved productivity on American farms. Urbani-
zation and industrialization required more food to be pro-
duced by fewer people, as industrial centers attracted
farmers away from the land and as cities filled with
immigrants. There was land in abundance, but there is a
limit to the size of the farm a man and his family can success-
fully plant, manage and harvest by hand, even with hired
help
.
Mechanization was the answer. Americans like Obed Hussey
and Cyrus McCormick began developing machines to do the
work of many men. Plows were developed with multiple blades.
Mechanical threshers were built that could harvest more wheat
47
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in less time. At first, these machines were horse drawn,
but as early as 1810 an Englishman, Major Pratt, applied a
49
steam engine to a farm tractor.
More and more land was brought into production, while it
was worked by relatively fewer people. In the early Nine-
teenth Century, 85 percent of the U.S. population were farmers
By the 1880' s only 44 percent were. Meanwhile, the Homestead
Act of 1862 caused huge tracts of public land to be put to
the plow.
The United States was perfect for increased mechaniza-
tion. The vast prairie of the American West encouraged large
farms where tractors moved easily and were cost effective.
Between 1880 and 1930, agricultural production in the United
States doubled. Most of this increased production resulted
from utilizing more land; but that was only practical as
mechanization increased.
Farm machinery continued to improve, especially with the
application of the internal combustion engine, but the next
major improvement was the widespread use of fertilizer. Man
has long understood the advantages of adding organic matter
to soil for improved yield. The practice of planting a field
48Jacob Schmookler, Invention and Economic Growth
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966) , App. D. Until
1846, about half of all agricultural inventions were produced
by Americans, half by Englishmen. After 1946, Americans




with legumes which fix their own nitrogen and which are then
plowed under has been common practice for many years. In
1849, an American firm, Chappel and Davison of Baltimore,
Md. developed the process for extracting plant nutrients, particu-
larly nitrogen from organic matter and creating an acceptable,
. . 50
convenient fertilizer. The problem was the cost. It was
cheaper to bring more land into production than to apply
large amounts of commercial fertilizer. After 1945, however,
this was no longer true. Most of the best farmland was
already being tilled, and petroleum had become relatively
cheap. As a result, from 1945 to 1979 fertilizer use increased
eightfold, helping double farm production again between 1930
and 1979. 51
This was accomplished on less land by fewer people. In
1979, 6 percent fewer acres were harvested than in 1930, and
farm population had dropped relatively and absolutely, from
about 30 million or 25 percent in 1930 to only 6.2 million
or less than 3 percent in 1979. Currently less than 2.3
52percent of the American population is engaged m farming.
These changes reflect the influence of technology on
agriculture. The land-labor-capital mix of farm production
has changed constantly. In 1880, labor accounted for 62
50Encyclopedia Americana , 1964 ed
.
, S.V. "Fertilizer."






percent of agricultural inputs; land and capital were about
19 percent each. By 1940, labor had dropped to 40 percent,
capital had risen to 41 percent. In 1976, only 16 percent
of agricultural inputs were attributable to labor. Land
input had risen to 22 percent, while capital had soared to
62 percent.
Capital in agriculture is represented in feed, livestock,
seed, fertilizer and machinery. It is the last two items
which represent both the most important contribution and the
most capital. Farm machinery today is bigger, more efficient
and more expensive. A man picking corn by hand in 1930 could
harvest about 40 bushels or two acres per day. A modern
picker can harvest 6500 bushels or 65 acres, and it costs
more than $100,000. A large mid-western farm may have three
of them. The cost of fertilizer is affected directly by the
cost of petroleum. The low price of oil after World War II
encouraged widespread application of fertilizer, and huge
crop yields have resulted. But fertilizer prices have risen
as precipitously as oil prices in recent years and represent
as much as one third of a farmer's capital outlay in a given
year.
American agricultural technology is also reflected in
the labor to product ratio. In 1880, 100 bushels of corn
required 180 manhours . In 1978, only 4 hours were required.
Wheat dropped from 373 to just 10 in the same period.
Ibid
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Poultry production improved 2000 percent between 1940 and
1970. b4
Furthermore, these advances are related to other gains
in productivity. For example, as recently as 1945 it took
14 to 18 weeks and 16 pounds of feed to raise a four pound
chicken. It now takes half the time and half the grain--
51 days and 8.2 pounds of feed. In 1950, the average dairy
cow produced 5314 pounds of milk annually. In 1982, the
average annual yield was 12,316 with 20 percent less grain
required. Hybrid corn, developed by the painstaking, time-
consuming methods of cross pollination, has improved corn
yield in the United States from 22 bushels per acre 50 years
55
ago to over 100 bushels per acre currently.
The United States has been responsible for the develop-
ment of hybrid corn, rust-resistant wheat, and blight resis-
tant potatoes. Developed largely in the land grant colleges
sponsored by the Homestead Act, these and other advances are
the result of the most extensive agricultural research and
development program in the world. In 1981, the United States
spent more than one billion on agricultural research. These
efforts have produced important results such as a poultry
vaccine for Newcastle disease developed at the Virginia
Agricultural Experiment Station. The results are economically
54 USDA, Agfax-- Interesting unpublished items regarding
agricultural advances in the possession of the author.
55 Ibid.
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efficient as well, providing a return of 25-50 percent for
each research dollar spent. The Newcastle vaccine alone is
estimated to save $1 billion annually worldwide.
Furthermore, U.S. research has not only generated new
developments, but also shortened the time span between success
in the laboratory and success in the field. Such techniques
as plant tissue culturing allow improved varieties to become
commercially applicable in 6-7 years.
Nor are American expertise and resources applied only to
U.S. agricultural needs. The United States has historically
funded 25 percent of the base costs of the Consultive Group
on International Agricultural Research, CGIAR, through the
Agency for International Development. In 1981, this amounted
to $32 million applied directly to refinement and improvement
of rice, dwarf wheat, kasava, etc. CGIAR is particularly
involved in improving agricultural production in tropic,
arid, and semi-arid regions. CGIAR not only sponsors re-
search, but also promotes education and application of proven
methods and techniques.
The United States also serves as the major center for
education. With the broad base provided by the land grant
colleges, the United States hosts several hundred foreign
students each year, many of whom return to their own countries




These efforts have paid off well. It is impossible to
transfer much of the technology that produces American abun-
dance. An eight row combine would barely be able to turn
around on most farms in the Third World. Still, certain
aspects have been successful. In Pakistan, the average wheat
harvest in the late Seventies was 76 percent bigger than in
the early Sixties. The Third World holds the key to feeding
the world's increasing population by virtue of the under-
utilized agricultural resources available. The Third World
has over half of the earth's arable land, which if properly
managed and cultivated, could produce far more food than at
present. Many of the plant varieties and farming techniques
which have successfully doubled and redoubled U.S. production
have yet to see widespread use in Lesser Developed Nations.
All of these numbers are somewhat dazzling. They are
important and impressive, because they show how the world
agricultural production has been able to keep pace with
population growth. But they are history. Everyone is
modestly acquainted with the world as it is today. The impor-
tant question is what happens next? Population growth rate
has slowed, but there are still more mouths to feed at the
end of each day. What discoveries have yet to be made that
will feed them and their children?
One of the most important new techniques has to do with
the fundamental farming practice of plowing. In earlier
years, intensive tillage called for one crop to be planted,
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nurtured, and harvested and its residue turned under before
a new crop was planted. This allowed farm machinery to move
quickly and easily through the fields, but it also encouraged
excessive run-off of rain and precious irrigation water which
also promoted soil erosion thereby reducing residual pesti-
cide and nutrient amounts. A new practice, minimum tillage,
was developed in the early Seventies, necessitated by rising
fuel costs. Minimum tillage, or conservation tillage as it
has come to be called, encourages the farmer to leave plant
residue in the field and to plant the next crop directly
through it.
At first, minimum tillage offered only the saving of
fuel required for additional cultivation. It caused problems
as seeders jammed and planters clogged. But it soon became
apparent that minimum tillage offered advantages to offset
these problems and stand as a beneficial practice on its
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own merits.
The most important advantage is a significant reduction
in soil erosion. It has been estimated that over the last
century, the United States has lost as much as half of its
5 8fertile topsoil in some areas; and that rate of deterioration
57 Richard & Phillip et al., "No-tillage Agriculture,"
Science 208: 1108-1113. See also USDA 1981 Yearbook, pp.
65-68.
5 8Council for Agricultural Science and Technology (CAST)
,
Soil Erosion: Its Agricultural, Environmental, and Socio-
Economic Implications, Report 92 (Ames, Iowa: CAST, 1982)
.
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was accelerating in recent years under the intensive farming
practices used. By leaving plant residue in the field, wind
and water take less of a toll. Subsequent crops require less
pesticide and fertilizer. They also require less irrigation
because the covered soil retains as much as double the moisture
of bare soil.
Minimum tillage has also encouraged double cropping
since seed can be applied sooner because it is protected by
cover from frost. The time saved in not refilling the land
allows the second crop to be planted with enough time to
mature. In some cases, the second crop is seeded by air
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while the first crop is still in the field.
Another technique gaining wider acceptance is the use of
insects for pest control. Using this method, a population of
insects is raised in a laboratory. These insects are irradi-
ated under controlled conditions which renders them sterile
but vigorous. The laboratory population is then released
into the environment where they mate with insects already
present. The next generation simply never develops. This
practice has the advantage of avoiding potentially harmful
chemical insecticides and of precluding the growth of a popu-
lation resistant to the particular insecticide applied.
In the area of herd management, scientists are now able
to extract a fertilized egg at very early stages, before the
59Phillips et al.
60USDA 1981 Yearbook, pp. 125-127
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cells have begun to differentiate. The cells are divided as
many as four times producing four identical embryos, which
are reimplanted in surrogate mothers. The result is four
calves instead of one. Artificial insemination, an experi-
mental technique 10-15 years ago is now widely practiced.
It allows fertilization of a particularly productive female
with an expecially strong male in a process that produces more
vigourous offspring in far greater numbers. Embryos for
which no surrogate mothers are immediately available can be
frozen for future implantation.
Another important success in the area of herd management
is a computer link between the ranch and the USDA extension
office. The rancher dials the extension office computer and
applies his home computer. He then enters his herd size and
present feed and silage inventory. The extension computer
contains current costs and availability of alternative feeds
which it compares with the individual ranchers supplies. It
then produces a recommendation regarding how much of each
feed to buy for the most effective and productive mix. The
optimum feed solution produces better cattle at lower cost
in terms of both money and grain requirement.
These are techniques currently available, and gaining
wider acceptance. Other techniques will soon become available
W.R. Gomes, "Emerging Biotechnology in Animal Agricul-
ture," in Agricultural Research Institute (ARI), Emerging
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affecting other areas of agriculture. For example, the
application of satellite-based infra-red sensing technology
has shown promise in crop management. Infra-red imagery can
reveal areas of farmland which are excessively dry or show
signs of initial insect or fungus infestation. The farmer
can then investigate and resolve the problem before it
affects a larger portion of his crop. This technique promises
to reduce excessive pesticide application and wasteful irri-
gation or fertilization.
At the edges of agricultural technology are two of the
most exciting and potentially productive areas of research,
genetic engineering and nitrogen fixation. Scientists have
been experimenting with plant genetics since before Luther
Burbank and have created more productive and healthier vari-
eties as a result. Their methods were time consuming and
arduous, requiring each generation to mature, picking the
best plants from among that group, cross pollinating them,
and awaiting the result. The discovery of DNA and its role
in heredity promised to shorten this process considerably.
The potential is enormous. An average plant uses about
two percent of the energy from the sun which reaches it.
For each additional percent of sunlight utilized in photosyn-
. . 64
thesis, the plant doubles its productivity. Genetic
63 Ibid., pp. 116-118.
64 Brian A. Larkins, "Application of Biotechnology to
Plant Improvement," in ARI , Emerging Technology
, pp. 15-25
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experiments are underway to alter the growth pattern of
plant in order to allow more efficient use of sunlight. In
another area scientists are attempting to isolate the genes in
halophytes, plants which thrive in salt water, in order to
introduce that capability into other plants, thereby increas-
ing the amount of land considered arable.
Genetic engineering enters into the second area of note.
Man has long recognized that legumes improve the soil by
their ability to fix free atmospheric nitrogen. Legumes
contain a unique enzyme, nitrogenese, which enable them to do
this. Once the process is fully understood and the genetic
requirements recognized, scientists will be able to introduce
this capability into other plants such as wheat, barley,
corn, and sorghum, which presently require significant amounts




There are just a few of the areas presently under examina-
tion which offer the possibility of continued agricultural
growth. Certainly a farmer in Bolivia is not likely to have
a home computer to use in the near future, but then what farmer
in the United States expected to have one, ten years ago.
Furthermore, the world has come to rely on the United States
for both food production and agricultural technology. Any
Ibid. See also E.L. Dalley et al., "Recombinent DNA-
Food for Thought," Food Technology
, July 1981: 26-33.
Ibid.
58
developments which enhance America's ability to grow more
abundant and more nutritious food will improve the U.S.
position vis-a-vis the rest of the world in a food crisis,
and will buy time so that other advances more appropriate
to the Third World can be applied before a food crisis.
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V. THE ROLE OF AMERICAN ABUNDANCE
It seems clear, then, that these problems have solutions.
They are solutions which will cost significant amounts of
money, and require consistent determination and strength of
will. Although they may solve only part of the problem, the
prospects are good for averting chaos and disaster which would
resqlt from excessive population and widespread famine as
described by Malthus, Meadows and others.
The prospect of continued and growing domination of the
world food market by the United States is equally good. The
United States has the resources and technology to maintain
and improve its already enviable position. To accomplish
this goal, the country must recognize the potential of this
situation in order to take the best course of action to
guarantee its position and to take fullest advantage of it.
The influence to be gained relates to the correlation in
the United States of the two factors which are most directly
applicable; population growth relative to agricultural produc-
tion. When these factors are combined, the United States has
a commanding lead.
It is important to fully appreciate the implications of
this leadership role and to better understand both the
responsibilities to be shouldered and the advantages that
could accrue to the United States from this position. To do
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this, it is helpful to consider the strength of the United
States compared to the rest of the world, developed, develop-
ing and lesser developed countries and most particularly, the
Soviet Union.
Even though the anticipated technological advances seem
likely to allow agricultural production to keep pace with
population growth in the near to middle future, the rapidity
with which these advances can be transferred and the degree
to which they can be applied to lesser developed countries
is limited. Furthermore, while some countries are making
strides, or at least small steps, toward population control,
world population continues to grow at a rapid pace creating
greater pressure on American agricultural resources. Economic
development tends to alleviate pressure from that direction
by slowing the birth rate, but it tends to increase the
pressure from other directions, particularly by creating
greater demand for improved diet especially for more animal
products.
Agricultural trade throughout the world increased 300
ft 7
percent in the last two decades. Agricultural trade between
the United States and the Third World accounted for a substan-
tial portion of that increase. Driven largely by population
growth and economic development in the Third World, the United
States exported 115 percent more to Less Developed Country's
r *7
USDA 1981 Yearbook, p. 215.
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in 1983 than in 1973. Since population within those coun-
tries grew about 23 percent during that time, the proportion
of food supplied by the United States increased as well.
Furthermore, the United States' proportion of agricultural
aid also increased, both in the areas of direct aid in the form
of foodstuffs provided as grants and in the form of agricul-
tural technology. In 1983 the United States gave away more
69food than the next five donors combined. The 5,464,000 tons
of wheat and feedgrains provided by this country represent
more food than the combined agricultural output of Central
America in this area. The United States also spent $17.4
million sending teachers, specialists and consultants, in
addition to machinery and equipment, to less developed
70
nations. In the middle Sixties, agricultural assistance
under the Food for Peace program instituted by President
Kennedy amounted to more than 53 percent of all U.S. foreign
aid. Current levels have not diminished and still account
for more than 30 percent of all foreign aid provided by the
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United States.
This growth in food aid as well as in agricultural trade,
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post war role as leader of the free world. In shrugging off
previous isolationist tendencies, the United States accepted
a role theretofore unfamiliar to this country. Part of that
role was deemed to be "Breadbasket of the world." The United
States recognized the danger inherent in chronic hunger and
dislocation. Therefore, the Marshall Plan included massive
amounts of direct food aid. Of the approximately $12.9
billion allocated under the Marshall Plan, $5.1 billion, or
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nearly 40 percent took the form of direct food aid.
In 1954, the President and the Congress recognized both
the need to transfer growing agricultural surpluses and the
potential those surpluses provided. The result was Public
Law 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act, which for 30 years has constituted the basic framework
for U.S. agricultural assistance programs. The Act, known
commonly as PL 480, has been lauded, maligned, condemned
and endorsed. It has been restricted, expanded, and amended,
but it has remained the fundamental legislation regarding
American food aid programs.
Critics of PL 480 have denounced it as manipulative and
counterproductive. They point to figures that show the great-
est contributions occurring in years of greatest surplus
in the United States which tend to correspond with better
harvests worldwide and therefore with less need. This allows
72 Seymour E. Harris, The European Recovery Program
(Cambridge: Harvard Univeristy Press, 1948), pp. 168-169.
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the United States to gratuitously dispose of its own surplus
at the expense of less fortunate farmers in the Third World
since it drives prices down, which discourages expansion.
In addition, the ready availability of American grain as a
supplement in any year serves as a disincentive to national
policies to promote production.
Although such criticism was probably valid in the early
years of the program, later amendments have stipulated
increasingly rigorous application procedures that have gone
far toward promoting economic and agricultural development.
There are three sections to PL 480—Titles I, II, and
III. Title I programs are those allocations granted on long
term, low cost credit and concessional bases. Title I is
aimed specifically at promoting economic and agricultural
development by alleviating pressure on the local government
caused by high food prices and chronic food shortages.
Current requirements for Title I aid call for carefully
detailed self-help programs to be submitted with the appli-
cation. In these proposals, the applicant country outlines
policies and actions to be taken to promote agricultural self-
sufficiency and economic growth. If certain conditions are
met, such as a commitment to use the food directly for wages,
repayment of the principle and interest of the loan can be
extended or entirely forgiven. Using food aid as wages
frees labor from agriculture -to be used in developing other
areas of the economy, thereby fostering economic growth.
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Title II aid is direct assistance to meet urgent needs
caused by flood, drought, and other severe but temporary
emergencies. It normally takes the form of a grant provided
through CARE, Catholic Relief Services or another international
organization. For the past two decades, the United States
has consistently provided about 60 percent of all the food
aid distributed through these channels.
Title III, like Title I, provides aid in the form of a
loan designed to meet basic nutritional requirements, promote
health services, and encourage population planning. It is
specifically targetted toward the world's poorest countries,
those with less than $300 annual per capita income. As under
Title I, provisions are made to forgive the loan in its
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entirety if certain requirements as to its use are met.
Despite the criticism of PL 480, or perhaps because of
it and the changes it has brought about, American agricultural
assistance programs have shown some important results. Aside
from the economic recovery in Japan and Europe fed largely
by U.S. assistance, PL 480 programs have made a significant
contribution in several other areas, most notably Taiwan and
the Republic of Korea. Between 1954 and 1980, these countries
received $394 million and $1.94 billion, respectively, in
food aid from the United States. Of that total, $65 million
was in the form of grants to Taiwan and $309 million to
73USDA 1981 Yearbook, pp. 238-247
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Korea. The economic expansion encouraged partly by this
aid has not brought about agricultural self-sufficiency but
has allowed them to feed their people through standard
commercial avenues. Korea has not received food grants
since 1976, though that country still avails itself of the
provisions of Title I. Taiwan has received neither grants
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nor concessional sales since 1970. Each of these countries
continues to rely heavily on the United States for a substan-
tial portion of its agricultural requirements, but these
shipments are commercial sales, paid for by means other than
low interest U.S. government loans.
Over the years, American agricultural assistance has been
subject to many of the same political constraints as other
American aid. PL 480 was amended in 1962 to exclude Cuba
and again in 1965 to exclude North Viet Nam. In 1966,
countries which traded with Cuba and North Viet Nam were
excluded from the Food for Peace program, as they had been
from other U.S. aid programs. Aid has been withdrawn, as in
the case of Cuba and Viet Nam. Aid has been withheld, as
7 f>
in the case of Pakistan and India during their 1967 war.
74 United States Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract
of the United States: 1984 , 104th edition (Washington:
Bureau of the Census, 1983), p. 674.
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While there is no way to ascertain how the world would
be different had the United States not embarked on such an
ambitious program, it seems likely that the differences would
be important. The massive subsidies provided to Cuba and
Viet Nam by the Soviet Union, to make up in part for loss
of American aid and trade, have diverted funds from other
uses, though the Soviets have gained other, less obvious,
advantages from those arrangements. Additionally, U.S. food
aid has helped stabilize nascent democracies and has quelled
turmoil that might otherwise have offered an opportunity
for Soviet or Soviet proxy interference.
Critics charge that it has generally masked the problem,
and failed in its goal to promote development. Such a charge
is difficult to prove or disprove. Agriculture is basic to
economic development, but it is only one of many factors.
Just as U.S. agricultural assistance is not solely responsible
for the economic growth of Taiwan and Korea, it is not solely
responsible for the economic stagnation elsewhere. One thing
seems certain--there would have been many more deaths world-
wide from famine and starvation had the United States not
filled the need. But then there would be fewer people to
feed now— is famine not natural population control?
It is impossible to credit U.S. agricultural superiority
with creating a better world. It is even difficult to point
to clear cases where U.S. agricultural pressure was success-
fully applied to enhance American security. However, there
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are instances where food as foreign policy failed dismally.
Cuba, India, and Viet Nam come quickly to mind, but two more
important cases are the grain embargo of the Soviet Union
imposed by President Carter in the wake of the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan, and the partial embargo imposed by
President Ford on the Soviet Union in 1975.
The 1975 embargo, or moratorium as it was called, was
imposed by President Ford in connection with negotiations
to obtain petroleum from the USSR. The objective was not
only to establish an alternative to OPEC but to weaken OPEC
by forcing the Soviets to commit to a reduced price.
In the spring of 1975, there were indications that the
Soviets would again need to purchase substantial amounts of
grain as they had in 1972. The massive Russian move into the
international grain market and particularly purchases made
from the United States were made so secretively that it
was called the Great Grain Robbery. Henry Kissinger had become
convinced that these purchases indicated a weakness that could
be exploited to American advantage. He convinced the President
when he reminded Ford that the huge purchases made in 1972
had fueled inflation, a reoccurrence of which the President
was eager to avoid.
However, Secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butz, had not been
party to the strategems developed by Kissinger, and Butz'
assistant, Richard Bell, was actively promoting grain sales.
Consequently, when President Ford imposed the moratorium,
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partly to prevent inflationary price increases, and partly
to apply pressure in the oil negotiations, the United States
was already committed to selling ten million tons of grain to
the Soviets.
Kissinger and the grain power advocates gained the advan-
tage in July, however, when the International Longshoreman's
Union threatened to boycott loading ships with grain bound
for the Soviet Union. The union was concerned about rising
prices, and about ensuring enforcement of the agreement reached
in 1972 that one third of the grain shipped to the Soviet Union
would go in American bottoms. To gain labor cooperation in
loading the grain already committed, the Ford Administration
promised to negotiate a long term agreement with the Russians
that would stabilize the erratic influence their massive
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and irregular purchases had on the grain market.
Discussion of further details of the intra-executive
machinations is unnecessary. Kissinger insisted that the
agricultural agreement be linked directly to oil concessions.
It did not work. The Soviets were unwilling to be seen as
either bending under American pressure or as undermining
OPEC in any way; nor were they desperate for American grain.
For the moment, they were meeting their needs elsewhere.
Canada and Australia had ample surpluses to make up the
7 8difference, and were more than willing to do so.






Another factor that mitigated against the United States
was the control of world grain shipments exercized by the
Big Five: Cargill, Continental, Louis Dreyfus, Bunge and
Andre. These privately owned, international grain export
companies account for over 75 percent of all grain shipments
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in the world. They are to agriculture what Exxon, Texaco,
Getty and the like are to petroleum. While they were unable
to ship grain from the United States directly to the Soviet
Union, they could easily ship to an Eastern Bloc country
for transhipment; or they could divert shipments with other
destinations to the Soviet Union and make up the difference
with American grain. In 1975, they used both of these
methods, and skirted American restrictions with ease.
Furthermore, grain was the only commodity affected by the
embargo, which caused significant discontent in the farm
states of the American midwest. Their voices grew louder
as the summer wore on. When , in September, it finally became
apparent that the embargo would have no effect, grain nego-
tiations were concluded and an agreement reached with no link
to oil, restrictions were lifted but not before the midwest
had become largely disenchanted with Kissinger, and to a lesser
extent, President Ford. It is interesting to note that for
the 1976 Presidential campaign, Ford chose as his running mate,







by the grain embargo and solidify support in the Republican
Midwest which he would otherwise have had little concern
over. Had he been able to choose a person more suited to
the industrial Northeast, for example, he might have been
re-elected.
The lessons of the 1979-1980 grain embargo were not much
different from those taught by the 1975 moratorium. The
election in 1976 and subsequent change of administration
required that they be taught again.
The reasons for the failure in 1979 were much the same as
those in 1975. As in 1975, grain was the only commodity
restricted. Farmers felt that they were being forced to bear
the full cost of President Carter's foreign policy. Although
it is true that the restriction applied only to shipments
above the eight million ton ceiling agreed to in 1975, the
Soviets imported an additional 23 million tons during 1979-
1980. Roughly half of that additional requirement would
normally have been filled by the United States.
Furthermore, neither Canada nor Australia imposed similar
restrictions, though they deplored and publicly denounced
Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. Their own grain exports,
especially combined with the share they gained from the U.S.
restrictions, caused them to put economic self-interest first
Finally, 1979 was a banner year in agriculture with
several nations reporting record or near-record harvests.
This enabled Cargil, Andre and company to easily fill Soviet
requirements outside of the United States.
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The lessons are clear. Although the U.S. supplied one
quarter of Soviet grain requirements, it was not the only
source available. The flexibility in the world food market,
particularly in grain, precluded the United States from
achieving any significant aim. The result would probably
have been different had Canada and Australia viewed the
situation in the same light as the United States. Action by
the Soviet Union that is not merely deplorable, but which
directly threatens the security of the West, could produce a
more concerted effort by the major grain suppliers, in which
even the major export companies might join. Such action could
in turn cause significant difficulties for the Soviet Union
domestically as well as in Eastern Europe.
Clearly recent attempts to apply agricultural pressure
to the Soviet Union have not produced the desired or intended
results. On the other hand, for the past several years, Soviet
agriculture seems to be suffering from a serious malaise. The
Kremlin has recognized this situation, but has been unable to
alter the results appreciably despite renewed emphasis and
application of significant additional resources.
The Virgin Lands program initiated by Nikita Khruschev
brought 83 million acres to the plow between 1955 and 1961
but most of that land was of marginal value for intensive
agriculture and has since reverted to pasture. The Breznev
8
Robert L. Paarlberg, "Lessons of the Grain Embargo,"
Foreign Affairs 59 (Fall 1980: pp. 144-162. See also
Emma Rothschild, "Food Politics," Foreign Affairs 54
(January 1976), pp. 285-307.
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era saw an important rise in capital investment devoted to
agriculture. The Soviets now expend 27 percent of their
total capital investments in agriculture, which amounts to
$50 billion annually.
One of the most important changes in Soviet agriculture
has taken place in the last 15 years. Starting around 1969,
the Soviet leadership began making an intensive effort to
improve the average Russian diet by including more meat. The
target of this program was to increase yearly meat production
to 185 pounds, about 3/4 of the average American consumption.
To do this, the Soviet Union had to abandon the practice of
alleviating the effects of a bad harvest by reducing livestock
herds, which had created an erratic cycle of huge surpluses
in one year followed by widespread shortages for several years
thereafter as they attempted to rebuild herd size. This deci-
sion to produce more meat more consistently corresponds with
Soviet entry into the world food market on a large scale.
Their first bad harvest after the program was announced
occurred in 1972 and led them to make their first large
purchases from the United States.
The program to encourage meat production in the Soviet
Union has faltered in recent years, however. After attaining
125 pounds per capita in 1975, meat production has made no
further significant gains, despite consistent large imports
of high quality feed grain from the West.
In fact, the difficulties experienced in meat production
are characteristic of Soviet agriculture across the board.
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In six basic agricultural commodities--grain , meat, milk,
potatoes, vegetables, fruit, and sugar--the Soviet Union has
failed to meet production records set between 1977 and 1979.
An important part of these shortfalls is the nature of
the Soviet system, lacking incentives, knotted by bureaucracy,
tightly controlled from the center, and frequently mismanaged.
But that is only part of the problem since they have managed
to achieve significant accomplishments in other areas under
the same system.
In truth, a large portion of the blame for the disapoint-
ing performance of Soviet agriculture falls on Mother Russia
herself, specifically the geographic position of the country
and the resultant climate. Only 1/3 of the arable land in
the Soviet Union is south of the 49 parallel. In the
United States, nearly 2/3 of the arable land is south of the
48 parallel. This difference is vital to the American
ability to produce two crops per year in many areas of the
country. The northerly location of the country affects meat
production directly as well. With little or no winter protec-
tion from the elements, cattle in the Soviet Union use a sub-
stantial portion of their feed calories just to keep warm,
instead of producing more meat. The difference shows up at
the slaughterhouse. An American steer matures to 1100 pounds
by the time it goes to market. In the Soviet Union, the
average weight of a steer is only 772 pounds.
Another important difference between the two countries
is obvious in average rainfall. In the United States, 60
74
percent of the arable land gets at least 28 inches of rain
each year. In the Soviet Union, only 1.1 percent of the
arable land gets as much as 28 inches.
The Soviets have other problems related to both the geo-
graphic location of the country and the system under which
they function. Another aspect of the problem with meat
production is the fact that they have not specialized their
herds into beef cattle and dairy cows as the West has . In
the United States cattle breeding has produced animals which
are specifically more efficient for each of those functions.
Holstein and Gurnsey are two of the primary dairy breeds in
the United States while beef cattle are mostly Black Angus
and Shorthorn. Consequently, American ranchers not only get
more meat from each herd of cattle, American dairymen get
more milk. In the latter case, the difference is an amazing
140 percent. The average cow in Russia produces 5000 pounds
of milk each year. In the United States, the average produc-
tion is over 12,000 pounds; and both milk and meat production
in the United States require less feed.
These figures point out a decided weakness within the
Soviet economy, one which the Russian leaders do not seem
able to rectify. Although past attempts by the United
States to exploit that weakness have proven ineffective, the
fact remains that the Soviets are increasingly dependent upon
feed and grain imports from the West in general and from the
United States in particular.
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With this historical background in mind, and in light of
current trends in population as well as projected advances
in agricultural technology, the following questions remain:
"Will current trends allow the U.S. to exercise greater
influence? If so--how and when should it be used? If not,




There is no doubt that the United States will continue
to play the leading role in world food production for some
time to come. There is hardly even a group of countries
which if they joined forces, could challenge the American
position seriously. Nor is there any doubt that the world
will continue to rely on the United States to feed its ever-
growing population. Over the last ten or more years, there
is not a single case of a country going from a net importer
of agricultural products to a net exporter. There are
numerous instances of countries which once exported food
and which now import food.
This position of leadership carries tremendous responsi-
bilities for the United States. No country has a greater
effect on the world food situation than the United States.
Nowhere else do policies and practices conducted both domes-
tically and internationally, carry the weight and consequence
that they do in the United States. The decisions taken in
this country regarding agricultural production and distribu-
tion affect the lives of billions of people.
With these considerations clearly in mind, the United
States must still act in its own best interests. It cannot
long promote a policy or set- of policies in agriculture which
are detrimental to those interests any more than it can do
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so in defense and national security. Therefore, it is time
to consider those policies which should be employed, and to
what end.
Domestically, the United States must do all it can to
encourage efficient production, with due consideration to
such encroaching factors as soil erosion, water availability,
and other land use requirements. The optimum situation of
course is to sell as much as can be produced at the highest
possible prcie. This is no more consistently possible in
agriculture than it is in automobile manufacture. Nonetheless,
the government began to remove itself from the market in
the late Sixties and early Seventies by reducing agricultural
price supports. Circumstances in the world food market made
this possible and profitable. The result has been erratic
and some have called chaotic food prices, but it has also
resulted in greater food production and availability.
While favoring reduced subsidies and supports in general,
it is important to recognize that for the profit motive to
work, a profit must be made. So the United States should
promote a modest reserve system and encourage such a system
internationally. Reserves are an expensive proposition. To
hold 38 million tons of cereal as reserves would cost $2.5
billion to purchase and $300 million per year to hold. But
properly managed, an international grain reserve system can
stabilize prices, encourage production, and provide emergency
resources for use in the event of major crop failure and
impending famine anywhere in the world.
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Furthermore, a national grain reserve makes sense from
a security point of view. It is clear that the Russians
hold substantial amounts of grain in national reserves. The
exact amount is a very closely held secret, but it has been
estimated that in 1975, as a result of harvest shortfalls,
they drew down nearly 17 million tons of grain to maintain
herd size. They would hardly have done so if there were not
much more available.
The last important domestic policy which the United States
should follow is to continue and encourage expansion of
agricultural research and development. Agricultural technology
has contributed significantly to the pre-eminent position of
the United States in world agriculture, and with most of the
best land already being intensively cultivated, the contribu-
tions of technology will become even more important.
With regard to the Third World, the role for the United
States is complex and challenging. Many developing countries
are more dependent on food from the United States than on
their own domestic production. This is a situation which
the United States must handle carefully. Heavy-handed pres-
sure can have serious ramifications and arouse long lasting
resentment, even if successful in the short run or applied
toward a beneficial goal.
The two primary goals which the United States should pur-
sue in the Third World are .population control and agricultural
development. It is absurd to think that the United States
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The United States must also assist and encourage the
development of agricultural technology relevant to the Third
World. Most countries of the Third World have very little
capital and relatively more labor, so American agricultural
techniques cannot be readily applied. The United States should
support regional and local research and development projects
which address themselves specifically to the situation as
it exists in the Third World. The United States should also
impress on local governments the fundamental nature of agricul-
ture in order to achieve greater local support for research.
The Third World includes more than half the arable land
available, but accounts for less than 11 percent of the funds
allocated for agricultural research.
Finally, the United States must develop and pursue a
coherent policy with regard to agricultural trade with the
Soviet Union. Whereas in the Third World, American policies
should be directed toward reducing dependence on the United
States, policies directed toward the Soviet Union should do
everything possible to encourage dependence. This does not
mean selling the Soviets wheat and feed grains at a discount,
but it does mean making available as much grain as they want
consistent with meeting traditional American commitments to
Japan and other allies, and charging them full market price.
In the near term, if it does nothing else, this policy
helps drain Soviet hard currency reserves, which would
otherwise be available to procure advanced technology. At
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the same time, it helps encourage full production of American
farmland saving the United States millions in farm subsidies.
In the middle term, the policy encourages the Russians to
continue to promote meat production and consumption, which,
for them, is relatively inefficient. It also makes the reduc-
tion or withdrawal of meat more difficult and politically
detrimental which leads to the long term aim of the policy.
The more dependent the Soviets are on the West and particu-
larly the United States for food, the more carefully they must
consider the consequences of actions inimicable to Western
interests. Although in the past the West has failed to act in
concert in this area, the situations in which the question
arose did not strike at the core of Western interests. By
encouraging dependence and by holding that card closely, the
United States can improve its position in certain conceivable
situations. The threat of a grain embargo must not be bandied
about nor applied without specific intentions. In fact, the
less frequently it is mentioned, the more effective it can be.
One important scenario in which it is conceivable that a
total grain embargo might be imposed by the United States in
concert with Canada, France, and Australia--to great effect-
is after a Soviet invasion of Iran in a drive toward the
Persian Gulf. Vital Western interests are clearly at stake
in such a situation and the threat of losing 25 percent or
more of their annual grain requirement would perhaps give
the Russians reason to pause at least long enough for the
Allies to act.
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In sum, American agriculture has long been the backbone
of the country. It continues to be a source of strength and
influence. America has always been generous in sharing
the bounty it derives from its farmland, and there is no
reason to be less so in the future. But in an ever more
crowded world, the vast natural endowments of this country
will be increasingly important in helping to promote stability,
prosperity and peace . Second only to the ingenuity of the
American people, the abundance of the American land is this
country's most important strategic resource.
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